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The Impactof Annuity Insurance
onSavings and Inequality
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the amount of precautionary savings arising from
life span uncertainty by comparing saving behavior under perfect insurance
arrangements with that arising under imperfect arrangments, namely when longev-
ity risk can be pooled only with members of one's own family. We consider
both intergenerationally altruistic preferences and selfish (zero bequest
motive) life cycle preferences, determining stochastic steady state wealth
levels and wealth distributions in both nde1s.
The central findings of the paper are: (1) perfecting insurance
arrangements can sharply lower savings in both intergenerationally altruistic
and life cycle economies and (2) in intergenerationally altruistic economies
perfecting annuity insurance can greatly influence the degree of inequality;
indeed, in the long run in our del,where everyone has the same endowments,
switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can mean the dif-
ference between absolute inequality and absolute equality.
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While death and taxes may be the two most certain elements in one's
life, the date of one's death is surely one of the least certain. Uncertainty
concerning the length of life is obviously of great importance to saving deci-
sions; "taking it with you" is not an option, but immediately consuming all
resources (less an intended bequest) is no alternative either, since with high
probability one will still be alive, but be very poor, in the immediate
future. To avoid the prospect of remaining alive in a state of relative
poverty, risk averse individuals will be cautious about their rate of consump-
tion. The extent of precautionary- saving motivated by life span uncertainty
depends on the availability of market and non—market annuity insurance. Annuity
insurance permits those who live longer than average to share the economic risks
of this outcome with those who live shorter than average. This paper examines
the amount of precautionary savings arising from life span uncertainty by com-
paring saving behavior under perfect insurance arrangements with that arising
under imperfect arrangments, namely when longevity risk can be pooled only
with mbers of one's in family. We consider both intergenerationally
altruistic preferences and selfish (zero bequest motive) life cycle preferen—
ces, determining stochastic steady state wealth levels and wealth distributions
in both models.'—2—
The central findings of the paper are: (1) perfecting insurance
arrangements can sharply lower savings in both intergenerationally altruistic
and life cycle economies and (2) in intergenerationally altruistic economies
perfecting annuity insurance can greatly influence the degree of inequality;
indeed, in the long run in ir nodel,where everyone has the same endowments,
switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can nan the dif-
ference between absolute inequality and absolute equality.
There are now several studies that examine the impact of annuity
insurance on saving. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) were the first to point out
that a fully funded Social Security program could alter household saving
through its provision of annuity insurance, assuming such insurance is not
otherwise available. Hubbard (1983) reaches a similar conclusion in a partial
equilibrium life cycle analysis. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Davies (1981)
discuss the size of involuntary bequests in life cycle ndels in the complete
absence of Insurance arrangements. Fuller descriptions of life cycle economies
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Peled(1983) and Abel (1983). Both papers consider the stochastic steady state
properties of economies in which agents involuntarily leave bequests to their
children.
While each of these papers Indicate that improvements in annuity
Insurance reduces precautionary saving, their specification of bequest beha-
vior In the absence of annuity insurance is either incomplete or rather
arbitrary. For example, Eckstein et.al. and Abel assume that while parents are
selfish and have no interest in their children, theynonethelessinvoluntarily—3—
bequeath alltheirwealth to precisely their own children, extracting no quid—
pro—quo in exchange. An alternative assumption explored by Kotlikoff and Spivak
(1981) is that selfish parents and selfish children Jointly pool longevity risk
in a manner that is imitually beneficial. Kotlikoff and Spivak point outthat
longevityrisks are substantial as measured by the amount of resources even
mildly risk averse selfish individuals would sacrifice to gain access to fair
annuityinsurance. In addition they demonstrate that risk sharing among even
as few as two relatives can provide a large fraction of the gains available
from perfect insurance. Hence, in selfish life cycle models, longevity risk
pooling between parents and children appears well "worth the trouble," with
the gains far exceeding any reasonable transactions costs. In contrast to the
selfish life cycle model, in the altruistic model, the pooling of otherwise
unirisureable longevity risk between parents and children is an immediate
implication of utility maximization since the utility of children is an argu-
ment In the utility function of parents.
Our model of risk sharing arrangements between parents and children
assumes the smallest possible family risk sharing pooi, namely, at most one
parent sharing risk with one child at any point in time. Since family
insuranceapproaches perfect insurance asthe number of family members
increases, this assumption leads to the largest precautionary motive for
saving and provides an upper bound for calculating the potential decline in
savings resulting from perfecting annuity insurance arrangements.2
While at most two relatives are simultaneously alive, risk sharing
in both the altruistic and selfish models also involves all future genera——1L—
tions.In the altruistic ndel current relatives conciously take into account
the impact of their behavior on their decenderits' inheritances and, therefore,
their levels of expected welfare. As a consequence, altruistic families auto-
matically share any current adverse shocks with future generations by reducing
the bequests they leave to future generations In the life cycle del the risk
sharing arrangments between current parents and children is chosen taking into
account that today's adverse shocks will affect the future bargaining position
of current children when they strike selfish deals with their children. This
future bargaining with the next generation is, in turn, contingent on the
nature of subsequent future bargaining with the succeeding generation, and on
and on ....Hence,the solution to the bargaining problem between living family
members takes account of the infinite sequence of bargains struck by family
descendents.
The next section considers the impact of annuity insurance in an
intertemporal altruistic econonr in which families can borrow the present
value of their certain future labor earnings. Assyxsptotically the distribution
of resources and consumption in this econonr approaches complete inequality with
successively fewer families holding all the econorry's resources and engaging in
all the econo's consumption. Section III considers a presumably re
realistic financial setting in which altruistic families cannot borrow against
the present value of their infinite stream of future earnings. In contrast to
the unconstrained borrowing case in which the altruistic econon,r's savings is
infinitely elastic at a particular interest rate, with borrowing constraints
aggregate savings is a continuous increasing function of the interest rate.—5—
In addition, the reduction in steady state wealth from introducing perfect
annuity insurance is considerably larger if there are borrowing constraints in
the altruistic econony. The borrowing constraints also lead to a stationary
wealth distribution in contrast to the increasingly unequal, asymptotically
degenerate wealth distribution arising in the altruistic econonr without
borrowing constraints. The fourth section contains our life cycle xmdel of
bargaining in which non—altruistic agents consider the infinite sequence of
selfish bargaining agreements. The calculations in this section suggest a
very sizeable effect of perfecting annuity insurance on long run savings.
The udels in sections II anc IV have four potential periods of life,
while section Ill's model has at zst two periods oflife.A minimum offour
periodsis necessary to examine selfish life cycle bargaining. While section
III's analysis of liquidity constrained altruistic behavior could be formulated
in the four period framework, simplifyingto two periods greatly reduces the
computationalcosts of solving the problem. To facilitate comparisons of the
predictions of the three dels all illustrative calculatIons are based on a
commonutility function and parameters Inthe two period ndel of section III
arecalibrated on the basis of the four period dels' parameterizations. In
the final section, V, there is a summary of the paper's findings and suggestions
for additional research on issues of precautionary savings.
II. The Unconstrainted Intergenerationally Altruistic Model
In this del and that of section IV there are four periods of life.
People live with certainty for thefirst three periods and surviveto the fourth
withprobabilityP. Children are one when their parents are three. Individuals—6—
are exogenously endowed with labor earnings which they receive during the
first three periods of life. Hence, the present value of earnings for an
altruistic family is certain, and we assume in this section that families can
borrow the present value of the infinite stream of earnings.
The family's utility function is taken as separable in consumption of
the parent (Cf) and the child Cc) over time. Throughout the paper we con-





where y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The utility of children
is assumed to enter the family's expected utility function, with weight e, and
future utility is assumed to be discounted by the tine preference factor ci.
Let stand for the family's total human plus non-human wealth at
time t. The expected utility of a family with a one period old child and a
three period old parent at time t is a function of and is denoted, V(w).
Equation (2) expresses V(w) in terms of the certain utility of the child's
and parent's immediate consumption, the expected utility of their subsequent
period consumption, and the expected utility of the family when the next child
is born. For notational convenience the time subscript, t, is omitted wherever
the time period is implicitly clear. In addition, we set t =1initially.
Cl—I Cl_I Cl_ICl_I
(2)v(w1) =maxi + + apt +s2a+ciV(W3afl—7—
+cx(1—p)Ie2d +av(W3dfll
The first two terms on the right hand side of (2) are, respectively, the
family's utility from the parent's third andthechild's first period consump-
tion. The bracketed terms multiplied by P indicate the family's expected
utility in the case the parent lives through the fourth period. The child's
second period consumption in this case is C2 and the family's full wealth
at the time the initial child is a parent is W3
a
In the case the parent
dies early, the child's second period consumption and the family's resources
when the child becomes a parent are, respectively, C
2 dand W.dThe
— S,
bracketedterms multiplied by a(i—P) express the family's expected utility if
the parent dies early.
The family is constrained in maximIzing (2) by:
(3) W =C +c +R(C +C+w ) 1 f3 si fls2,a 3,a
W C+C+R(C +RW ), 1 f3 si s2,d 3,d
where B is one divided by one plus the interest rate. These equations simply
relate the ongoing family's full future resources at the time the child becomes
a parent (w or W d to the appropriately discounted difference bet—
3,a
ween initial family resources and total familyconsumptionduring the child's
first and second periods. The two constraints correspond to the two possible
outcomes——theparent dying early and the parent dying late.
Giventhe functional form for Vmaximizationof (2)subjectto (3)
is straightforward. Consider the following as a possible solution ftnctfnV(W):
v(w) =k
W
wherek is a constant. Next replace in (2) V(W3)byk—8—
andv(w3d) by k3,d
•Withthis substitution V(w1) is now a homothetic
function of each of the consumption demands plus 1*13and W3d. Hence, the
solution values for the consumption demands and W3a and W3d are all propor-
tional to 1*11. Inserting these solutions into (2) and collecting constants,
we have:
wi_I Wi_I
() v(w1) =k =g(P,c&,O,R,y,k)
wi-I
where g(P,a,G,R,I,k) is the sum of constants iltipiying after solution
values have been substituted into (2). From (1), k =g(P,cz,O,R,y,k),and this
expression can be used to solve for k.3 Hence, we have a proof by construction
wi-I
that v(w) =k is the form of the value function in (2).
The homotheticity of the value function (2) permits an immediate
characterization of the evolution of full resources for each family through time





where A and D are constants depending on the model's parameters P,cL,8,R, and y.
For each family expected resources when the current child becomes a parent,
EW3, are related to initial resources by:
(6) EW3 =1A +(l—P)D1w1.
Since this equation holds for all families regardless of their initial value of
per capita wealth in the economy will remain constant (assuming an arbitrary
large number of families) if and only- if:—9—
(7) PA +(l—P)D=1.
Now A and D depend on the interest factor R, as veil as the fixed survival
probability and the fixed preference parameters. Hence, in general
equilibrium R mist adjust until the values of A and D satisfy (7). Since A and
D are xnotonically increasing functions of H, there is a unique value of R that
satisfies (7))Theeconomy's long run supply of savings is clearly
infinitely elastic at this value of H, since for larger or smaller values of H
full resources (human plus non—human wealth) in the econony either grow indefi-
nitely or decline to zero.
The term A islessthan D reflecting the additional demand for fourth
periodparental consumption in the case the parent lives to consume Cf.
Since,by (7),theweighted sum of A and D equals unity, we have A <1,and D
>1.Hence, when expected futureresourcesequal current resources each
favorable rtality outcome reduces the family's resources, while each unfa-
vorable rtality outcome increases its resources.
Theprocess governing the family's accu.ilaton and decumlat1on of
wealth through time, with time measured ingenerations, can be expressed as:
(8) = We
whereequalslog A wit1 probability P and log D with probability 1-P.
Expressing the process in terms of the logarithm of family resources, we have:
(9) log =logW +
Theexpected value of is negative since:—10—
(10) E =FlogA +(1—P)logD < log(PA + (1—P)D) =0,
using the concavity of the logrithmic function and (7). Hence, the logarithm
of family resources is a random walk with a negative drift. Since each fami—
ly's resources follows this process, and, by assumption, all families start
out with the same initial resources, the distribution of each family's resour-
ces as well as the distribution of any functions of family resources, such as
the logarithm, are equivalent to the econoimj wide distributions. The fact
that the logarithm of resources follows a random walk with drift indicates
that there is no stationary distribution of resources in the econoixiy. Although
the ian value of family resources is constant, the distribution of family
resources becomes increasingly unequal through time.
To see this rewrite as =—p+ where s i.i.d. with
zero nan and variance a2. The expected logarithm of resources at t+T is
given by:
(11) Elog W+ =logW —Tp,and
the variance of the logarithm of resources at t+T given log W is:
(12) Var(log Wt+T) =Ta2
Equations (ii) and (12) indicate that for each successive generation the distri-
bution of the logarithm of resources has a smaller mean and a larger variance.
Not only are successive resource distributions less equal, as indicated by the
increasing variance of the logarithm, but they are also increasingly skewed.
This is suggested by the fact that the mean of the logarithm of resources falls—11—
through time at a faster rate than its standard deviation rises. Using
Chebyshev's inequality one can show that the fraction of families whose resour-
ces in the future exceed their current values is bounded by a number that decli-
nes with each successive generation.5 Assymptotically the econony's resource
distribution approaches complete inequality with an infintesimal fraction of
families holding all the economy's resources and the rest holding no resources.
This increasing inequality should be contrasted with the complete equality that
arises in the case of perfect insurance under the same assumption that all fami-
lies have identical initial resources. While each family conciously plans to
pursue a policy that leads to imxniseration with essentially 100 percent probabi-
lity, the process of immiseration can be quite slow.
Table 1 presents calculations of the econonr's reduction in savings
per worker from switching to perfect insurance for a set of illustrative para-
meter values. Given knowledge of the equilibrium interest rate under imperfect
annuity insurance determined in (7), savings per worker is calculated assuming a
Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital share equal to .3; i.e., the
economy's general equilibrium condition is that the rginal product of capi-
tal equals the interest rate, which provides an equation for computing the
econon's stock of savings (capital) per worker. Under perfect insurance the
family'sbudgetconstraint is simply that the present expected value of con-
sumption equals the present value of resources. As is well known, in this
case R equals a in the steady state, and this equation plus the rginal pro-
ductivity condition are used to solve for steady state savings per worker
under perfect insurance.6Table I
The Unconstrained Altruistic Model —
PercentageSavings Reduction from Switching from





—6.9 .86 1 .6
..48.6 .10 1 4 .6
—33.4 .24 1 4 .6
—20.0 .50 1 4 .6
—3.7 .99 1 14 .6
0.0 .99 1 14 .6
—6.1 .86 2 14 .6
—8.6 .86 .5 14 .6
—13.4 .86 .1 14 .6
—26.2 .86 1 10 .6
—.8 .86 1 1 .6
—.8 .86 1 .5 .6
—4.3 .86 1 14 .8
—7.8 .86 1 14 .4
—6.1 .86 1 14 .2
—75.1 .24 .5 10 .5
—62.8 .50 .5 10 .5
*Calculatjons assume a Cobb—Douglas production function with capital's output
share equal to 30 percent.—12—
In the base case a, the time preference factor equals .86 and F, the
fourth period survival probability equals .6. If we think of each period as
corresponding to roughly 15 years, then the .86 value corresponds to a 1 per-
cent annual time preference rate, and the .6 fourth period survival probabi-
lity is roughly equivalent to a life span of 514 years. We view "children" in
the ImDdel as really young adults who are initially roughly age 20 and who
are parents of adult children at roughly age 50. Hence, the 51.4 year life
span corresponds to a real world adult life span starting at 20 and ending, on
average, at 714. Base case values of y and 0 are 14 and 1 respectively.
Adopting the base case parameters, the altruistic econonr's total
savings is 7 percent larger with imperfect family annuity insurance than with
perfect annuity insurance. This figure is quite sensitive to the time pre-
ference rate. Ceteris paribus, lowering a to .5, which corresponds to a 14.1
percent annual time preference rate, implies a ich smaller stock of savings,
but a 20 percent difference between savings under family and perfect annuity
insurance. For cx equals .214, equivalent to a 10 percent annual time preference
rate, there is a 33 percent savings reduction. The reduction is 149 percent
for a equals .10. Alternatively, assuming a equals .99, there is essentially
no difference between savings under family and perfect insurance
arrangements.7
The sensitivity of savings changes to the weight on the child's uti-
lity, 0, is surprisingly small. As 0 rises nre weight is placed on the con—
sumption of the child, and, in the limit, as 0 approaches infinity, lifespan
uncertainty does not affect utility since families only care about their—13—
childrens' consumption which is not subject to lifespan risk. ience as 0
rises B approaches a and the savings reduction from perfect insurance goes to
zero. While Table 1 indicates larger precautionary savings the smaller the
value of 0, lowering the value of 0 from 1 to .5 raises precautionary savings
by less than two percent. The precautionary savings response to larger values
of y, the relative risk aversion coefficient, also has the expected positive
sign. The magnitude of the savings difference is quite sensitive to y. For
values of y below 1 precautionary savings is less than .5 percent of the
total; on the other hand, it is 26 percent for y equals 10, assuming base case
values of other parameters. Finally, precautionary savings appears to be
maximized for values of P between •14 and .6. This is also intuitive, since
uncertainty disappears from the del when P equals zero or unity. The bottom
two rows of table I consider combinations of parameters choosen to raise the
level of precautionary savings. For a equals .214, 1 equals 10, and 8 and P
both equal to .5 there is a T5 percent reduction in the econoxj-'s wealth stock
associated with switching from family to perfect annuity insurance. This
figure declines only slightly, to 63 percent, if a equals .5 and the other
parameters take these specified values.
Table II illustrates the transmission o inequality through tine. The
first generation of families is assumed to have identical resources. The table
reports the fraction of resources held by the poorest 10 percent, 30 percent,
50 percent, and 90 percent of families. Since the del's two periods between
generations correspond to toughly 30 years, the resource distribution, after
10 generations corresponds in teal time to roughly 300 years. In the baseTable II
Resource Inequality in the Unconstrained Altruistic Model
after Successive Generations
Generation
1 10 50 200
Base Case
Resource Share of
Poorest 90 Percent .90 .88 .83 .80 .00
Resource Share of
Poorest 50 Percent .50 .245 .314 .30 .00
Resource Share of
Poorest 30 Percent .30 .26 .16 .15 .00
Resource Share of
Poorest 10 Percent .10 .08 .06 .014 .00
Coefficient of
Variation of
Resource Distribution .00 .12 .27 .57
Base Case Except u.5
PoorestShare of .90 .81 .62 .27 .00
Poorest 90 Percent
Poorest Share of .50 .33 .16 .03 .00
Poorest 50 Percent
PoorestShare of .30 .17 .07 .01 .00
Poorest 30 Percent




Resource Distribution .00 .145 1.23 5.13case the increase through time in inequality is extremely slow, with the
richest 10 percent holding only 20 percent of total resources after 200
generations. The time preference factor, a, appears to be the st critical
parameter for affecting the rate at which inequality increases through time.
The transition to complete inequality is nnich faster if a equals .5 and the
other parameters are held at their base case values. Lowering a to .5 produ-
ces roughly the same degree of inequality within 10 generations that arises
after 200 generations when a equals .86. After 200 generations (6,000 years
in real time) of the a equals .5 process, the 10 percent richest families own
almost three quarters of all resouces. If a equals .2I (a roughly 10 percent
annual time preference rate) the 10 percent richest families own close to 30
percent of all resources after 10 generations. This compares with 19 percent
for a equals .5 and 12 percent for a equals .86. A time preference rate of 10
percent per annual is quite high, but is within the range estimated empirically
(Hausman (1979)). In addition the associated equilibrium interest rate of 8.5
percent computed on a yearly basis, while high, is not implausible.
While risk premiums in uncertainty rdels are not invariant to the
specified number of periods, it iy be of some interest to know the welfare
gain from perfect insurance in this nde1. Assuming base line parameter
values the lack of perfect insurance has a small ——lessthan 1 percent ——
welfarecost as measured by the percentage increase in resources with family
insurance required to obtain the expected utility level under perfect
insurance. As expected this figure is highly sensitive to the degree of risk
aversion. Ceteris paribus, raising y to 10 raises the equivalent variation to—15-.
almost16percent.
To summarize these findings, in the unconstrained intergeneration—
ally altruistic nde1 switching from family to perfect insurance reduces
aggregate savings by either a ndest or a significant amount depending, pri—
manly, on the time preference rate and degree of risk aversion. The time
preference rate is critical for determining the rate at which the resource
distribution becomes re unequal. If one accepts a relatively high time pre-
ference rate, the idel suggests an important potential contribution of imper-
fect annuity arrangments in increasing inequality.—16—
III. The Constrained Altruistic Model
The solution to the unconstrained altruistic model involves, in the
long run, essentially all families holding close to zero future resources,
meaning they are in debt by an amount equal to the present value of their cer-
tain future labor earnings. In constrast, this section examines the behavior
of the altruistic econon' under the assumption that families cannot borrow
against their future earnings. For this problem the state variable
corresponding to equation (2) is no longer full future resources, rather it is
current non human wealth, At. To simplify the numerical calculations required
to solve this problem we considered a two period version of the section II
model. Each child lives for one period with certainty and survives with pro-
bability P for two periods. Hence, when children are born their parents may






where A1 is the family's initial non humanwealth.A2a is the value of such
assets at the time the grandchild is born given that the grandfather lives
for two periods. If the parent is dead when the child is born the family's
expected utility, EUd, is:
Cl—I
(i) EUd (A1) =e sl:d+cxV(A2d),
where A2d is the family's assets when the grandchild is born, given that the
grandfather dies at the end of period 1.—17—
The expected utility function V(A) is defined by:
(15) v.(A) =P +(i—n)
If the initial father (the second child's grandfather) is alive, the family






C +C ( f2 sl,a
In (16) e is the child's first period earnings. The constraint that C2 +
Csi,a
not exceed A1 implies that familyassetsare never smaller than e. The






The valuefunctionV(A) as well as the consumption demands C C
f2, sl,a
and 1d
were computed numerically using the contraction properties of the
maximizatIon problem (Denardo (1967))eSpecifically,we started with a guess of
the function V(A) and used this function to solve for EU (A )andEU (A ).From al dl
(15) these EU(A1) and EUd(Al) functions provide a new guess of the V(A) func-
tion. This iteration wasrepeateduntil the V(A) function converged to its
fixed point solution.
While there is a critical Interest rate above which the econony's
wealth increases without bound, there is a unique distribution of family
assets for each interest rate below this critical value. Corresponding to
each of these stochastic steady state asset distributions is an aggregate
stock of assets. Hence, the introduction of liquidity constraints in the—18—
altruistic Irxdel produces (1) a supply schedule of aggregate savings that
increases with the interest rate and (2) a non—degenerate wealth distribution.
The equilibrium interest rate in this imDdel is no longer determined solely by
household preferences, rather it is determined by equating the household
supply of savings to firm's demandsforsavings (capital).
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital share of
.3, a time preference factor a of .742 (corresponding to a 1 percent annual
time preference rate), and values of e and y equal to 1 and 4,respectively,
the constrained econony's equilibrium steady state capital output ratio is
roughly 30 percent larger than in the corresponding unconstrained ndel. For
these parameter values the reduction in aggregate savings from switching to
perfect insurance is 50 percent. This number should be contrasted with the 7
percent figure in the first row of Table I. The percentage reduction in
wealth in this del is highly sensitive to the value of cx. At a equals .25
(a I.7 percent annual time preference rate) the percentage reduction is 95
percent. At a equals .057 (a 10 percent assumed time preference rate) the
percentage reduction is 99 percent. The per capita wealth stock is much more
sensitive to a in the unconstrained perfect insurance version of this model
than in the constrained family insurance version. This is expected since for
values of a above a critical level the family is always constrained, and
assets in each family equal e, their lower bound (see (16) and (17)).
The lower boundona family's non—human wealth also nans a lower
equilibrium interest rate than with no borrowing constaints. Since families
always save at least as much with liquidity constraints as they do without—19—
these constaints, an interest rate equal to or greater than the unconstrained
equilibrium value would imply explosive wealth accumulation in the constained
case. The lower equilibrium value of the interest rate in the constained
model reduces the savings incentives of allagentsin the econonr, par-
ticularly those with the greatest wealth, and, therefore, reduces the disper-
sion in the distribution of wealth. For the base line parameter values the
richest 10 percent of families hold less than 15 percent of econony—wide
resources. Inequality in wealth, while limited in all our constained econonr
calculations, declines rapidlywithincreases in cz.—20-
IV. The Selfish Life Cycle Model
The family insurance mdel where each imber acts solely outofself
interest is re complicated. In this case all transfers that occur are the
result of ex—ante selfish bargains. A four period framework is required here
to permit these intergenerational risk sharing arrangements. When the
bargaining takes place the child is age one and the parent is age three.
The parent has one re period of certain life followed by one period of
uncertain life. The agreement reached by parent and child can be thought of
as the parent buying an annuity from the child. In return for some sxney in
period 3 the child promises to offer a specified level of support for the
parent in period 1 in the event that the parent lives that long.
Equivalently, the deal can be arranged such that the child gives the parent
some money before period 3 in return for being made beneficiary of the will of
the parent. The timing and labelling of payments in these arrangements is not
critical; what is critical is that the child share the risk of the parent's
lfespsn. Both of these arrangements involve such risk sharing. If the
parent dies prior to period 1 the child ends up receiving in present value
more ney than he (she) payè. Alternatively, if the parent dies late the
child pays rre ney in present value than he (she) receives. There is also
no requirement that those risk pooling arrangements be explicitly stated or
written down. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) describes mechanisms for enforcing
implicit family annuity contracts.
Both the parent and the child can be made better of f by striking
a bargain. However, there Is an indeterminacy as to how the gains from trade
should be divided. One can imagine an arrangement under which the parent's—21—
utility in the bargain is just the same as if no deal had been struck, and,
therefore, all of the gains from trade go to the child. Alternatively, one
can arrange the risk sharing such that all the gains from trade go to the
parent. An additional complication is that the child, in striking an arrange-
ment with the parent, considers the 3rd period bargain he (she) will make with
his own child. The expected utility from that future bargain is denoted V and
depends on the child's level of third period wealth (human plus non—human)
w ,i.e.,V =v(w).Sincewe assume that successive children all earn
s3 53
identical amounts with certainty in the first three periods of their lives,
the resources of the grandchild, with whom the child will bargain, is
supressed as an argument of V.
The frontier of the utility possibilities space with intergenera-





















As in (2), Cf3 and Cf14 are the parent's certain and contingent consumption
levels in periods 3 and 14. respectively; C1 is the child's first period con-
sumption, and C2a and Cs2d are the child's respective second period con—
su"iption levels contingent upon the parent being alive or dead in period 14.
Childreninitially have no non—human assets. Each child's certain present
value of labor earnings is W1, and his (her) parent's third period human plus
non—human wealth is W .Finally,W and W are the respective third
f3 s3,a s3,d
period wealth levels of the child, that he or she uses in bargaining with the
grandchild, contingent upon the parent being alive or dead in period 14.
Problem(18) involves n.ximizing a weighted sum of the two
participants' expected utility where the weight 0, applied to the child's
utility, potentially ranges from 0 to .Thechild considers his or her
consumption in periods 3 and 14undertwo eventualities: either the parent dies
early, and the child does not have to payoffon the annuity insurance
agreement(this is reflected in the final term of (18) which is weighted r
the(i—F) possibility of its occurrence), or the parent dies late and,
hence, the child does have to pay off on the annuity insurance (the fourth
termin (i8)). As stated, the v(w) functiongives the expected utility the
childexperiences from his third and fourth period consumption discounted
to period 3 of his life as a function of his wealth in period 3.
Problem (18) has two budget constraints; total consumption plus
savings for the child's third period equals total initial wealth of the parent
and child under both lifetime possibilities for the parent. The weight 0—23—
reflects the terms of trade in this bargaining problem. In general one would
expect 6 to be a function of the resources of both the parent and the child,
and W1, respectively. However, since W1 is constant in our analysis, we
express 6 =
O(Wf3).
Solving problem (18) for different values of 0 traces out the uti-
lity possibility frontier for family deals shown in Figure 1. Obviously,
not all values of 0 will generate outcomes that are in the core. We have
labeled as 0 the critical value for 6 for which the parent receives none
of the gains from trade (i.e., the child receives all gains from trade).
is defined symmetrically with the parent getting all of the surplus.
The point T is the threat point, indicating the parent's and child's
expected utility levels if they fail to bargain with each other. As is
clear from problem (18), figure 1 depends on the respective resources of the
father and the son, W and W ,andon the function V (.). sl f3 $
Sincewe consider a stationary environment in which tastes and
endowments of children remain unchanged, we will limit outself to sta-
tionary bargaining solutions. That is, we assume that the V function will
be the same for the bargaining of each successive pair of generations. An
implication of stationarity is that the parent's expected utility in (18)
expressed as a function of his wealth, W3 equals the child's expected
utility function, V, when the child becomes a father. An immediate property
of stationarity is that the child reaches the same deal with his child as
his parent did with him if respective resources are the same. More
forl1y, a stationary solution Is defined as a bargaining function 0(Wf3)














Pointvalues of consumption derived from solving problem (18), where
1 *1_I 1 '1 '1(w3) is substituted for v(w53), then V(Wf3) =1—1C
+
aPy—-
Solving problem (18) involves searching for a fixed point
function V and an associated O(Wf3) function that produces outcomes that
are in the core. We consider and compute three solutions to problem (i8).
In the first solution, denoted Os' the child receives all the gains from
trade; furthermore, all successive bargains involve children receiving all
gains from trade. In the second, solution, the initial and all suc-
cessive fathers receive all gains from trade. In the third solution the
gains from trade are always divided between child and son according to John
Nash's (19514) two person bargaining solution.
In the 8 solution parents receive their threat point level of
expected utility. This is the expected utility received by the parent if









Denote V (w )asthe nximum utility that the parent with wealth W can
5f3 f3
achieve on his n by solving (21). V(Wf3) is, thus, the indirect utility func-





1(1:1) k =R((i+(p) fIRI )Y
Naturally, V(Wf3) is the minimum the parent is willing to accept in
an annuity bargain with his child. V is also the expected utility func-
tion of the child in the 0 bargain with his on child. Replacing V with V
S *1_I
S
in(18) and choosing Os for each value of W such that V5(Wf3) = +
providesa proof by construction that V is a fixed point function for the
problem. In addition the computed values of 8 for different values
of Wf3 determine the function 0(Wf3). While parents, In this 8 bargain,
receive their threat point levels of expected utility, their actual pattern
of consumption differs from what they would choose on their own;
Cf3 is smaller and Cf greater than the respectivesolution values to
problem (21).
Although the V function was obtained analytically, finding an
analytic expression for V for other bargaining solutions is generally
not possible. For the the 8 and Nash (denoted e) solutions an
iterative technique described below is used to find fixed pointfunc-
tions and their associated 8 functions. Both the 0 and 0 solutions f n
require specifying the child's threat point. Given our assumption of a
cooperative, efficient solution to parent/child bargaining, the child, if he(she)
fails to bargain with the parent, can credibly assert to the parent that he (she)
will be able to reach a deal with his child. The child's threat pointEl?,
is the solution to problem (22); it involves the child's consuming Cand C sl s2
in his first two periods, respectively, and bargaining with his child
in period 3 based on third period wealth, W3.-26—
Maximize:
Tc;:1aC2 (22) Eu = +
$l—y l—y s3
subjectto
(23) C +RC +RW =W
si s2 s3 si
In the case of 8 bargaining, V is replaced by Vf in (22) as well
as (18). The solution proceeds by first guessing a. function Vf. Next
we solve (22) to determine the son's threat point utility EUT. Given the
guess of Vf and the derived value of EU', 0 is choosen in (18) such that
the son's expected utility in the solution to (18) equals EUT. This
last calculation is repeated for different values of WfB thereby
generating a function Of(Wf3). In addition to computing a O function
based on the initial guess of Vf the solution to (18) based on Of(Wf3)
determines the father's expected utility in the bargain. The t.xitnizing
*1_I 1—y
values of +P for different values of Wf3 provide an expected
utility function for the parent intheObargainwith the child. This
functionis used as the next guess of the Vf function, and the calculations
are repeated. The iteration proceeds until the guess of the V function
equals the parent's expected utility as a function of i.e., until
we have found a function V. which is a fixed point of the napping described.
In the Nash bargaining case a very similar solution technique
is applied. The Nash solution involves choosing 0 in (18) to mximize
the quantity (EUf —EU')(EU9
—EUT),where EUf and EU are the expected
utilities obtained by the parent and child respectively, and EU equals—2T—
V,the parent's threat point. To find V, the Nash fixed point function,
T
weagainchoose an initial guessofV and solve (22) to find EU. We
also solve (21) to find EU'. Next the guessed value of V is substituted
for V in (18), and Uis choosen to ri.ximize (EUf —EU)(EU
—EUT).
Repeating this last step for alternative values of W3 generates a
function 6(Wf3) as well as an expected utility function of the father arising
from Nash bargaining. This latter function is used as the second guess
of the Vn function. The iteration continues until we find a fixed point
function V. In this bargaining solution as in the previous
osolution,the 0 (w )ande (w )functionscalculated in the last
S ff3 n t3
round of the iteration correspond to the correct bargaining functions for
the functions Vf and V, respectively.
The V function is used as the initial guess of the V function
for the 0 and Nash bargaining solutions. In each iteration we computed
the solution to (18) for 80 different values of W13. We then fit a fifth
order polynoxninal in W3 to these points and used the resulting regression
as the guess of V in the next iteration. The iterative procedure for
determining V converged roughly by the 8th iteration;8 12 iterations each
were used for both the 0 and Nash cases.
Savings in the Life Cycle Model under Imperfect Family and Perfect
Insurance Arrangements
As described re fully in Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1983), the
stochastic steady state of the life cycle econonr hasa stationary andbounded
savings distribution. The distributions and stocks of wealth for each of the
bargaining cases were computed numerically as follows: first, we calculated—28—
the function a3 (w) anda (w) foreach of the three solutions to
s ,a 3 s3,df3
problem (18). These two functions indicate the third period wealth of a child
(when the child becomes a parent) whose parent brings Wf3 to the bargain arid
whodies, resprectively, either early or late. Starting with one hundred
thousand families with the sameinitialvalue of Wf3 werandomly assigned
thesetwo functions to each family in each generation according to the proba-
bility P of survival to period 4.Thedistribution of Wf3 stabilized after
roughly 8 generations. Unlike the case of unconstrained altruistic economies,
there is a non—zero positive lower bound as well as an upper bound on family
resources.9 The degree of inequality in parental asset holdings (Wf3)
generated by this model is rather moderate. The upper bound for Wf3 is only
l.Ttimesthe lower bound for ourbaseline parameters under 0 bargaining.
Thepoorest 50 percent ofparents haveclose to 45percent of allparental
assets, and the richest 10 percent have 18percentof all assets. These
figures proved highly robust to a wide range of parameter values.
Table III compares steady state per capita wealth stocks in the dif-
ferent insurance regimes under alternative assumptions about ageearningspro-
files.1° Eachof the age earnings profiles has a present value of 10, which is
received with certainty over the course of the first three periods. Since the
child's resources are identical in each of these cases, the consumption deci-
sions of the child and parent are the same for each of these earnings paths.
Hence, the difference in stocks of wealth by row in Table III are simply a
function of the timing of the receipt of labor income. The earnings profile
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The percentage reductions in wealth from ving to perfect
insurance reported in Table IV are very large. For the earnings profIle in
the third row the long—run wealth reduction is 59 percent starting from the
(children take all) stochastic steady state. It is 141 percent in the
case of an initial Nash bargaining equilibrium and 35 percent when the ini-
tial equilibrium involves ef (parents take all) bargain.
In contrast to the altruistic models of sections II and III, a najor
factor explaining the savings reduction In this model is the implicit interge-
nerational transfer associated with providing perfect annuity insurance. In
the family insurance equilibrium the expected inheritance of children is posi-
tive since children would not otherwise be willing to accept the additional
consumption risk arising from the parent—child annuity arrangement. Once per-
fect Insurance is available, parents as a collective group, will consume what
they would otherwise have bequeathed, on average, to their children. This
negative resource transfer from younger children to older parents reduces
the economy's savings because the parents, with shorter life spans, have
higher narginal consumption propensities than have their children. This
intergenerational transfer explains why savings falls significantly in the
life cycle model from introducing perfect insurance regardless of the value of
y. Recall that in the altruistic model of section II, introducing perfect
insurance lowers savings only very slightly for I <1.
The values in Table III are highly sensitive to the shape of the
age earnings profile. The smallest percentage wealth reduction arises when
all earnings are received in the first period; in this case wealth falls by—30—
20.1 percent starting from the Os bargain and by 13.9 percent starting from
the O bargain.
The percentage change in wealth appears relatively insensitive to
variations in the degree of relative risk aversion, y. For example,
reducing I from 14 to 1.5 lovers the percentage decline in wealth under row
3's earnings profile and initial 0 bargaining from 59.3percentto 50.7
percent. Raising y to 8 increases the value to 63.2 percent. Under Table
III's first age earnings profile the percentage wealth reductions starting
from 6 economies are 15.1, 20.1, and 22.9 for values of y equal to 1.5, 14,
and 8, respectively.
There is considerably more sensitivity to changes in the fourth
period survival probability P; however, the sensitivity depends on the
choice of earnings profile. For example, lowering P from .6 to .3, which
reduces the expected age of death from roughly 714 to roughly 69, converts
the 59.3 percent 8 reduction (row 3, Table iii) to 83.6 percent. The same
reduction in P raises Table III's row 1, 0 value from 20.1 percent to only
23.14 percent.
Unlike the previous two sections the analysis here is partial
equilibrium, i.e., the wage and interest rate are assumed fixed. Since the
wealth reduction from introducing fair annuity insurance would increase rates
of return and depress wages which stimulates savings, the general equilibrium
differences between family and perfect insurance are likely to be considerably
smaller than these partial equilibrium differences.
The large differences In wealth stocks in partial equilibrium bet——31—
veen the perfect insurance and family insurance regimes suggests that steady
state welfare could actually be lower in the case of perfect insurance. This
is indeed possible. Under (children take all) bargaining and assuming y
equals 1.5, the expected utility of even the child of the poorest parent
exceeds the uniform, steady state expected utility under perfect insurance.
Starting from a situation of zero insurance, achieving the perfect insurance
expected utility level requires a 7 percent increase in resources; achieving
the expected utility of the child with the poorest parent in the e stochasic
steady state requires an 8 percent increase in life—time resources, starting
fromthisbenchmark regime. Attaining the level of welfare of the child whose
parentin thesteady state has the nEximum potential wealth requires a
corresponding 12 percent increase in resources.
Anotherquestion raised by Table III is the extent to which imperfec-
tions in annuity nErkets can fully explain observed intergenerational
transfers. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) invoked the assumption of perfect
insurance arrangements in estimating that roughly 80 percent of private
U.S. wealth corresponds to accumulated inheritances of those currently
alive. This assumption that annuity insurance is fairly well developed in
the United States can be defended by pointing to social security and other
government annuities, private pensions, old age labor earnings that are
partly contingent on survival, and the potential for family risk sharing
involving multiple nmbers. Still, it is interesting to ask how their
calculation turns out when it Is applied to the two member family insurance
econon described above. Their technique involves subtracting accumulated—32—
consumptionfrom accumulated earnings for each cohort and then summing
across cohorts to get a total wealth stock. This "life cycle" wealth is
then compared with actual wealth holdings. If agents in the econoiy are
selfish and annuity arrangements are perfect or very- close to perfect, com-
puted and actual aggregate wealth will be identical or extremely close to
one another.
The two person family regime is, however, quite far from that of
perfect insurance. As described here, this imperfection produces a
stochastic steady state in which observed consumptior profiles often exceed
what could be financed from one's own labor earnings even under perfect
insurance. Hence, in this econony, subtracting, for all cohorts, accumu-
lated consumption, part of yhich is financed by past intergenerational
transfers, from accumulated earnings produces an underestimate of the
econony' actual wealth. For the 0 bargain, with y equals 4 and with Table
III's row 3 earnings profile, the underestimate is close to 90 percent
of actual wealth. Since Kotlikoff and Summers' calculation understates
U.S. wealth by 80 percent, imperfections in annuity- markets appear poteri—
tially capable of fully explaining actual U.S. intergenerational
transfers.—33—
V.Summary andConclusions
Thispaper has explored the impact of perfecting annuity insurance
onsavings andinequality using two standard neoclassical models ——the
Intergenerationallyaltruistic model and the non—altruistic life cycle model.
Whilethe modeling is intentionally structured to produce the maximumpre-
cautionary savings, the results are, nonetheless, quite surprising. Partial
equilibrium calculations based on the life cycle model suggest very substan-
tial reductions in national wealth associated with improving annuity
insurance. Indeed, in the life cycle model the reduction in savings from the
annuity insurance associated with social security could be larger than the
savings reduction arising from social security's "pay as you go" method of
finance. In addition, imperfections In annuity insurance appear potentially
capable of explaining a sizeable fraction of observed intergenerational trans-
fers in the U.S..
In the intergenerationally altruistic model perfecting annuity
insurance can also significantly lower national savings, but the results here
are imich more sensitive to precise parameter values as well as assumptions
about liquidity constraints.
In the presence of family annuity insurance each of the models pro-
vides a theory of the distribution of resources. While the life cycle model
suggests a rather limited dispersion in family resources in the stochastic
steady state, the altruistic model, absent liquidity constraints, generates
increasing inequality through time. Assymptotically the altruistic model's
resource distribution is completely skewed. In the long run virtually allfamilies hold close to zero resources and an infinitesimal fraction of fami-
lies hold all of the econoxrr's wealth.
The results of this analysis suggest the importance of studying
other ntives for precautionary savings such as uncertainty with respect to
future earnings and future health status. A variety of government programs,
including disability and unemployment insurance, welfare, and progressive
taxation may be greatly affecting the extent of precautionary savings in the
econosy. To the extent that such savings Is highly responsive to government
Insurance programs, the government may wish to offset their adverse savings
effects not by- reducing Its provision of insurance, but by using alternative
policy instruments that raise savings without increasing economic uncertainty.—35—
Footnotes
1. Our discussion of behavior in the life cycle model draws heavily
on Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1983).
2. See Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). This statement assumes inde-
pendent morality probabilities across family members.





where a =(i+e').For each set of particular values considered
in the paper there is a unique value k satisfying k =g().




a (1+01/1)1 M =ta1''+(aR_1v)l1R]1,and
N = + (aR_1v)1')huh1R11.
5. Actually Chebyshev's theorem provides an even stronger statement
about changes in the distribution of family resources through time. Let c
be an arbitrary constant. Then the probability at time t that log exceeds e
is bounded by a number that declines with tifloW. is less than or equal to C.—36—
If log W exceeds c, the bound on the probability that log W +exceedsc declines
log W_c
t t
withtforI •Inother words the bound of P(log Wt+1c) monotonically
declines with tifthe process hasalreadyreached c; and if not, it declines
monotoriically once the process has hadenoughtime to drift down to c. More
formally, from Chebyshev's theorem we have:
P(log w log W — +A/To)ijx,
where A is a positive constant. Choose Isuchthat c =logW — +
then:
c—logW+IP
P(log )c(1/A,whereA = —Ito
SinceTp >logW —c, >0and3(1/A)<o.
6. The intuitive explanation here is that as the time preference
factor approaches unity families become increasingly indifferent between their
own welfare and that of their far distant, indeed infinitely distant descen—
dents. At the limit, when a equals 1, current family members are completely
Indifferent between consuming nowandsaving everything for the future consump-
tion of their desceridents. They are also indifferent with respect to allo-
cating consumption at any point in time between children and parents, i.e.,
eliminating parental consumption andtherebythe entire concern with life span
uncertainty, is a tter of indifference to families when a equals 1. Since
lifespan uncertainty becomes an increasingly less important issue as a rises,
it is not surprising that for a equal to .99, savings with imperfect insurance
is equal to savings with perfect insurance.—37-
7. By "rough convergence" we an that economic choice variables
were identical to at least the second digit between iterations. For a range
of intermediate values of W3 the calculated consumption termsare identical
to five digits between iterations. While we believe re accurate values of
the V and V functions could be obtained, the computation costs of achieving
the additional accuracy is considerable; solving (18) for any one of the 80
values of Wf3 in any one of the 12 iterations requires rather extensive com-
putation.
8. The explanation for the upperbound is the following: As suc-
cessive parents continue to die early their children bring nre, but not pro—
portionatelyuxre resources into their own third period. When the parent dies
early, his or her child enjoys an increase in non—human wealth, but no change
in human wealth. Hence, when the child's non—human wealth rises by a given
percentage, his or her total wealth rises by- a smaller percentage. Hence,
even if a two period old child increased his (her) W3 proportionately in
response to an increase in total resources available at the beginning of
period 2, the increased non—human wealth received in period 2 would lead to a
less than proportional increase in Wf3.
9. The absolute size of these economies' wealth stocks may appear
small in comparison to the level of earnings or income in a particular period.
However, such stock—flow ratios must be adjusted for the fact that flows in
this idel are received over a period that corresponds to roughly 15 years.
In the case of the third and probably the st realistic earnings profile in—38—
Table IV, the ratio of wealth to one—fifteenth of a period's labor earnings is
6.9 in the case of the 6 bargain. A wealth—to—earnings ratioof6.9 is
somewhat greater than that observed in the United States.—39—
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